суббота, 20 февраля 2010 г.

Crisis in Psychology

Problems of the Theory and History of Psychology

袁之琦

v Robert W. Rieber and Jeffrey Wollock (1997). The Collected Works of L. S. Vygotsky. Vol.3. Problems of the Theory and History of Psychology. New York: Plenum Press.

v Content

Some major themes in Vygotsky's Theoretical Work: An Introduction. --- Rene ven der Veer.

On Vygotsky's Creative Development --- A. N. Leont'er Part I

Problems of the Theory and Methods of Psychology

Part II Developmental Paths of Psychological Knowledge

Epilogue --- M. G. Yaroshevsky & G. S. Gurgenidze

Notes to the English Edition

Notes to the Russian Edition

References

Author Index

Subject Index

Problems of the Theory and History of Psychology

Part I Problems of the Theory and Methods of Psychology

Chap1: The Methods of Reflexological and Psychological Investigation

Chap2: Preface to Lazursky

Chap3: Consciousness as a Problem for the Psychology of Behavior

Chap4: Apropos Koffka's Article on Self-Observation (Instead of Preface)

Chap5: The Instrumental Method in Psychology

Chap6: On Psychological System

Chap7: Mind, Consciousness, the Unconscious

Chap8: Preface to Leont'ev

Chap9: The Problem of Consciousness

Chap10: Psychology and the Theory of Localization of Mental Function

Part II Developmental Paths of Psychological Knowledge

Chap11: Preface to Thorndike

Chap12: Preface to Buhler

Chap13: Preface to Kohler Chap14: Preface to Koffka

Chap15: The Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology: A Methodological Investigation

The Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology: A Methodological Investigation Vygotsky (1927)

v Chap1: The Nature of the Crisis

v Chap2: Our Approach

v Chap3: The Development of Science

v Chap4: Current Trends in Psychology

v Chap5: From Generalization to Explanation

v Chap6: The Objective Tendencies in development of Science

v Chap7: The unconscious. The fusing of disparate theories.

v Chap8: The biogenetic hypothesis. Borrowings from the natural sciences.

v Chap9: On scientific language

v Chap10: Interpretations of the crisis in psychology and its meaning

v Chap11: Bankruptcy of the idea of crating an empirical psychology

v Chap12: The driving forces of the crisis

v Chap13: Two psychologies

v Chap14: Conclusion

客觀心理學(Objectivism)

v 蘇聯:反射學 (reflexology)

v 蘇聯:唯物辨證的心理學(Marxist Psychology)

v 德國:Gestalt Psychology

v 美國:行為主義

主觀心理學(Subjectivism)

v Bergsonism (柏格森)

v Dilthey (狄爾泰)

Angels 恩格斯

v Ideology is a process performed by a so-called thinker in full consciousness, even though this consciousness is false. The real impelling forces that set him in motion remain unknown to him. Otherwise this would not be an ideological process.

v 意識型態是由所謂的思想家有意識地,但是以虛假的意識完成的過程。推動他行動的真正動力,始終是他所不知道的,否則這就不是意識型態的過程了。

Chap 1: The Nature of the Crisis

v Vygotsky: First order problem of psychology

From: (1) Psychological practitioners of psychiatrist

(2) Industrial psychologist

Not From: (1) Philosophers

(2) Theoretical psychologists

Problem: 過去一直線的研究發展方式,逐步累積資料,已不適用,行不通了。原因是心理學已發展得太快速,太多元,卻無法解決實用上的問題。

v 兩領域影響大:(1)Psychopathology(2)Zoo-Psy

v Vygotsky: 心理學的各方面的訓練都到了轉捩點

v Development of psychology investigation

v The gathering of factual material

v The systematization of knowledge

v The statement of basic positions and laws

v Concept of general psychology ≠ Concept of the basic theoretical psychology

v Theoretical psychology: 一個成熟的正常人,應具動物心理學與心理病理學的訓練。此狀況並非來自於科學內部的自性,而是決定於外在的環境與現實。若不如此,那麼一個人就會喪失他的領導地位。而這衰退的狀況正在開始,故心理學系統內的先驅者(Freud, Adler, Kretshmer),開發了 unconscious 的概念。

Psychopathology

v 心理病理學:其發展,慢慢背離了無意識的核心概念(Freud, Adler),是從 fundamental methodological view 就已經不同了。

v 心理病理學從方法學上便認為可以由病人來推正常人,甚至認為正常人都或多或少有其不正常之處,也可以說正常人是main type,而病人統計學上一種的極端類型而已。反之亦然。

v 心理病理最早研究root of mind,且最重要的是病理是 internal nature of things,是 natural of the scientific knowledge.

Zoo - Psychology

v Zoo-Psychology: 基於雙重動機(1)Fact, (2)Principle,有其他的系統做推手,使動物心理學居於領導地位。其代表,即蘇聯的反射學(Pavlov)

v The logical beginning of a science of behavior, the starting point for every genetic examination and explanation of the mind, and a purely biological science, it is precisely this science which is expected to elaborate the fundamental concepts of the science and to supply them to kindred disciplines.

v Pavlov: Animal Psychology lay the foundation, and Zoo-psychology build the superstructure.

Vygotsky 導入他的分析:新勢力的興起

v It regarded man as the key to the psychology of animals; always the highest forms as the key to the lower ones.

v Marx: Referred to this methodological principle of the “reverse” method when he stated that “the anatomy of man is the key to the anatomy of the ape.”

v Marx 意指:Lower species of animals can only be understood when this higher principle itself is already known.

當你瞭解ground rent, 你就會瞭解quit-rent.

瞭解 bourgeois economy 就會瞭解 antique economy.

瞭解 feudal form 就會瞭解 bourgeois form.

瞭解人類思考和語言,就會瞭解動物的初級語言

當你接進過程的終點時,你就知道某中間過程接下來會如何發展。

Vygotsky Pavlov

v 單就方法論的觀點而言,Pavlov rejects the route from man to animal. He defends the reverse of the “reverse”, that is the direct path of investigation, repeating the route taken by nature.

v Pavlov wishes not only to win independence for his area of investigation, but to extend its influence and guidance to all spheres of psychological knowledge.

v In Pavlov’s opinion, science “guided by similarity or identity of the external manifestations” will sooner or later apply to the mind of man the objective data obtained. Pavlov’s path is from simple to complex, from animal to man.

Vygotsky 提出的答案

v Vygotsky: 命運掌握在你自己手中。

v Vygotsky: The simple, the elementary is always conceivable without the complex, whereas the complex cannot be conceived of without the elementary.

Vygotsky 此話有兩個含義: (1)上位者知下,下位者不知上。

(2)若無下(低層樓)則無上(高層樓)

v 問:Which discipline other than general psychology can decide this controversy between animal and man in psychology?

v 答:For, on this decision will rest nothing more and nothing less than the whole future fate of this science.

Chap 13: Two psychologies 13-1

v When one mixes up the epistemological problem with the ontological one by introducing into psychology not the whole argumentation but its final results, this leads to the distortion of both. In Russia the subjective is identified with the mental and later it is proved that the mental cannot be objective. Epistemological consciousness as part of the antinomy “subject-object” is confused with empirical, psychological consciousness and then it is asserted that consciousness cannot be material, that to assume this would be Machism. And as a result one ends up with neoplatonism, in the sense of infallible essences for which being and phenomenon coincide. They flee from idealism only to plunge into it headlong.” Two Psychologies

v Historical & Methodological dogma: Two psychologies 間的gap愈深,危機愈大。

v Third tendency: place themselves outside the struggle. 此第三勢力可以不在這兩系統之內,認為(1)融合兩者(2)彼此受制於對方(3)捨棄前兩者,建議新系統(4)兩系統受制於第三系統。

v Three fundamental pure system: (1)Gestalt theory (2)Personalism (3) Marxist psychology.

v 此三系統皆認為empirical psychology, behaviorism 皆不足,應有第三者在兩者之上,才會真正建立一 scientific psychology.

v Gestalt Theory:

v Kohler (1920), Koffka(1924), Wertheimer (1925)

v Formula: What takes place in a part of some whole is determined by the internal structural laws of the whole. (整體大於部份之相加)

v Gestalt theory does not view the mental and physical as absolutely heterogenous things, but instead asserts their connection. (身心不矛盾)

v Gestalt psychologist: The mind is the phenomenal part of behavior, i.e., in principle they choose one of the two ways and not a third one. (客觀論)

v Stern, W. L. (1919). Critical Personalism:

v Idea: Vygotsky 所提的三類他都不贊成. He proceeds from the assumption that we do not have a psychology, but many psychologies. (多元心理學)

v Stern formula: The basic fact is the existence of the psychophysically neutral person and his psychophysically neutral acts. (心理界 = 物理界)

v Vygotsky 認為 Stern: He provides a materialist conception of consciousness, i.e., within his system that same struggle is still going on which is well known to us and which he, unsuccessfully, wished to overcome. (客觀論)

v Stern is forced, like Münsterberg, to be an adherent of causal psychology in differential psychology. (歸類於差異心理學)

Marxist Psychology:

v 沒有自己的 methodology, 沒有自己的 formula, never yield system.

v Vygotsky 認為 Marxist psychology 混淆了兩目的,所以只會錯上加錯:(1)To examine the Marxist doctrine from the historical-philosophical point of view. (2)To investigate the problems of themselves.

v Vygotsky 認為這些人是:(1)In the wrong place. (2)For the wrong thing. (3)In the wrong manner.

v In the wrong place:

v Neither in Plekhanov nor in any of the other Marxists can one fine what one is looking for.

v 不但沒有 Methodology, 甚至沒有 Epistemology theory

v Plekhanov 雖自稱繼承 Spinoza, 但他自己卻從不曾任何與 psychophysiology, science 相關的事。

v Spinoza Galileo 的物理學為基礎,化為哲學語言。

v For the wrong thing:

v They are looking for pompous ontological formula此為空洞,且不會解決任何問題。我們要找的formula是要能為我們所用的。

v In the wrong manner:

v 他們用得是權威法則,不是方法,而是教條。

v Kornilov regards introspection as the only adequate way to know the mind, and not just as a technical device?

Frankfurt School:

v Such a science is impossible:

v 主張1: Mind is a special quality or property of matter, but a quality is not part of a thing, but a special capacity. But matter has many qualities, mind is just one of them.

v Chernychevsky 反駁:ice shine, hard 兩種屬性,是由一種科學來界定,而非有兩種科學來研究。

v 主張2: Plekhanov 認為心不會影響身,Frankfurt 則認為透過生理,身自己會影響身。此為 Schattentheorie (theory of shadow): Two man shake hands and their shadows do the same.

v Vygotsky 認為這根本不是方法論的問題,而是哲學的最崇高表述。

v Husserl: Eidetic Psychology (直觀心理學)

v Dilthey: Descriptive Psychology (敘述心理學)

v Chelpanov: Phenomenology (現象學)

v Stout, Meinong, Schmidt-Kovazhik: Analytic Psychology (分析心理學)

Vygotsky 認為這些人的類比法都是相同的:

v The mind must be studied as geometrical form, outside causality. Two triangles do not engender a square, the circle knows nothing of the pyramid. (Pavlov 不同意: 此與大腦幾何不同,不能適用於 real science.)

v If the mind cannot be linked with natural processes, if it is non-causal, then it cannot be studied inductively, by observing real facts and generalizing them. → 他們認為應該返回到Plato式的 ideas or mental essences.

Analytical Method & Phenomenological Method 有何不同?這也是 Two psychologies 不同之處。

v The method of analysis in the natural sciences and in causal psychology consists of the study of a single phenomenon, a typical representative of a whole series, and the deduction of a proposition about the whole series on the basis of that phenomenon. Chelpanov 舉研究不同的氣體為例。

v Two psychologies cannot have methods in common.

v From the special to the general is the key to all social psychology. Chelpanov: single observation can lead to a general conclusion.

v Analysis is in principle not opposed to induction, but related to it. It is the highest form which contradicts its essence (repetition).

v Pavlov brilliantly perceived the general in the particular. Ukhtomsky studied several preparations of frogs. Sherrington studied the scratching and flexive reflexes of the hind leg in many cats and dogs. 他們三人都嚴守the precise factual boundaries of a general principle in practice and the degree to which it can be applied to different species of the given genus.

Vygotsky 認為可以這樣的研究法,推廣於Conscious PsychologyArt Psychology.

v Well-developed forms of art provide the key to the underdeveloped one, just as the anatomy of man provides the key to the anatomy of the ape.

v Arts: fable, short story, tragedy, music, painting, tragedy, types of literature…

v Indirect method: Analysis and experiment presuppose indirect study. From the analysis of the stimuli we infer the mechanism of the reaction; from the command, the movements of the soldiers; and from the form of the fable the reactions to it.

Vygotsky 認為 Marx 也是用同樣的方法:The whole of Das Kapital is written according to this method. Marx analyses the “cell” of bourgeois society and shows that a mature body can be more easily studied than a cell.

Vygotsky Chelpanov analysis 不同處:

The analytical method is aimed at the knowledge of realities and strives for the same goal as induction. The phenomenological method does not at all presuppose the existence of the essence it strives to know. Its subject matter can be pure fantasy, deprived of any existence; (2) the analytical method studies facts and leads to knowledge which has the trustworthiness of a fact. The phenomenological method obtains apodictic truths which are absolutely trustworthy and universally valid; (3) the analytical method is a special case of empirical knowledge, i.e., factual knowledge, according to Hume. The phenomenological method is a priori, it is not a kind of experience or factual knowledge; (4) via the study of new special facts the analytical method, which relies on facts which have been studied and generalized before, ultimately leads to new relative and factual generalizations which have a boundary, a variable degree of applicability, limitations and even exceptions. The phenomenological method does not lead to knowledge of the general, but of the idea, the essence. The general is known through induction, the essence by intuition. It exists outside time and reality and is not related to any temporal or real thing.

Vygotsky Chelpanov analysis 不同處:

甲、 We see that the difference is as big as a difference between two methods can be. One method — let us call it the analytical method — is the method of the real, natural sciences, the other — the phenomenological, a priori one — is the method of the mathematical sciences and of the pure science of the mind.

乙、 Not one of the four points distinguishing both methods leaves any doubt about the fact that: (1) it is aimed at real facts, not at “ideal possibilities”; (2) it has only factual and not apodictic validity; (3) it is a posteriori; (4) it leads to generalizations which have boundaries and degrees, not to the contemplation of essences.

Psy. idealism vs. Psy. materialism:

Psy. Idealism: Phenomenon and being coincide.

v Husserl (1910): In the mental sphere there is no distinction between phenomenon [Erscheinung] and being [Sein], and while nature is existence [Dasein] which manifests itself in the phenomena.

Psy. Materialism:

v Feuerbach: The difference between thinking and being has not been destroyed in psychology. Even concerning thinking one must distinguish the thinking of the thinking and the thinking as such.

v Phenomenon & Being(哲學) = Mind & Matter(心理學)

v Hoffding: “A miniature dualistic spiritualism”, with the attempt to reduce, quantitatively diminish the reality of the non-material mind.

v Watson: Either mental phenomenon are non-material, or they are material.

v Lenin: [God-builder] differ little from the [Godseekers].

v When one mixes up the epistemological problem with the ontological one by introducing into psychology not the whole argumentation but its final results, this leads to the distortion of both.

Subject – Object:

v The relation between subject and object is an epistemological problem [Erkenntnisproblem].

v The relation between mind and matter is an ontological problem [Daseinsproblem].

v Both mind and body are for us objective, but whereas mental objects [geistigen Objekte] are by their nature related to the knowing subject, the body exists only as an object for us.

v The subjective itself, as a phantom, must be understood as a consequence, as a result, as a godsend of two objective processes. Like the enigma of the mirror, the enigma of the mind is not solved by studying phantoms, but by studying the two series of objective processes from the cooperation of which the phantoms as apparent reflections of one thing in the other arise. In itself the appearance does not exist.

Real vs. Apparent appearance:

v Titchener’s basic example: Muller-Lyer’s lines are physically equal, psychologically one of them is longer.

v Mental phenomena can only be described, but not explained.

v The nervous system does not cause, but it does explain mind.

v The mind is not always a subject. In introspection it is split into object and subject. The question is whether in introspection phenomenon and being coincide.

v Plekhanov: Self-consciousness is the consciousness of consciousness. And consciousness can exist without self-consciousness: we become convinced of this by the unconscious and the relatively unconscious. I can see not knowing that I see.

v Pavlov: We can live according to subjective states, but that we cannot analyze them.

Mirror Metaphor:

v The subjective itself, as a phantom, must be understood as a consequence, as a result, as a godsend of two objective processes. Like the enigma of the mirror, the enigma of the mind is not solved by studying phantoms, but by studying the two series of objective processes from the cooperation of which the phantoms as apparent reflections of one thing in the other arise. In itself the appearance does not exist.

v Let us remember that the mirror itself is, after all, part of the same nature as the thing outside the mirror, and subject to all of its laws.

綜合整理:

v Objective: Gestalt Psychology, Stern

v Subjective: Personalism

v Third way: Marxist Psychology

v Münsterberg: 結合 subjective and objective

v Münsterberg 兩錯誤: (1)Mixed up the natural sciences with the biological ones. (2)He understands the concept “natural” as a reference to the sciences about organic and non-organic and not in its fundamental methodological sense.

v Marx summary

v Natural-historical process

v Intermediate special theory of historical materialism

v Create our own “Das Kapital”

v Other Marx related

v Vishnevsky: Historical materialism

v Instead of “historical” we must develop a theory of psychological materialism.

v Stepanov: Dialectical materialism

v Dialectical materialism is a most abstract science. At best this leads to an accumulation of examples and illustration.

v 結論:Creation of a theory of psychological materialism.

v 美國:Titchener (subjective)& Watson (objective)

v 德國:Koffka (objective) & Stern (subjective)

v 俄國:Bekhterev (objective) & Kornilov (subjective)

v 應循之道:

v It does not lose itself in criticism and polemics

v It does not turn into a paper war, but rises to a methodology

v It does not search for ready-made answers

v It understands the tasks of contemporary psychology